THE INTERVIEWER: For the record,
this is Thursday, the 12th of November 2009. We're
in New York City. We're speaking with Meyer
(F sandy) Frucher for the CSEA 100 Project and,
Sandy, thank you very much for doing this.

MR. FRUCHER: You're welcome.

THE INTERVIEWER: We really do
appreciate it and I'm sure you're gonna have a lot
to add to our history here.

I wonder if you would begin by
telling us a little bit about when you first became
aware of an organization called CSEA.

MR. FRUCHER: Well, when I first
came to Albany, I came to Albany as Director of the
New York State Commission on Management and
Productivity in the Public Sector. I had just come
out of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and
I was full of ideas or crazy notions about what
needed to be done to make New York State more
efficient.

Obviously, and in so doing, you have
to deal with the issue of the work force and work
force issues and so I worked on a series of
projects or programs that dealt with issues that

would affect employees, so consequently I had to
talk to and I appropriately talked to the folks who
represented the employees, the labor unions, and in
that case it was -- CSEA was the predominant union.

THE INTERVIEWER: M-m h-m-m. Do you
just want to hold it there for a second while we
unplug the phone here?

About this commission, who founded it and --

MR. FRUCHER: Well, it was founded by the Legislature and the idea was to make New York City, New York State, more efficient.

THE INTERVIEWER: What year was this?

MR. FRUCHER: Oh, that was 1976.

THE INTERVIEWER: Okay. So it's early in the Carey Administration --

MR. FRUCHER: Yes.

THE INTERVIEWER: -- and at that time -- from there is that where you then went to the Governor's Office of Employee Relations?

MR. FRUCHER: Well, over the course of two years, from '76 to '78, I had a series of proposals that I was working on and would, you know, trundle over to CSEA and talk to the union and their representatives about various ideas, most of which from their point of view were non-starters, like Civil Service reform and -- but there were some that did spark some interest, like bridging the administrative or secretarial workers into the managerial ranks, on-site day care, and a variety of other programs that I was able to engage in a series of dialogues with the union about, so I got to know the various players and they got to
And even if they thought I was misguided in a lot of ways, I think they at least gave me some credit for being sincere in my desire to improve the efficiency of State government and in the quality of life of the employees, and so that dialogue went on for a couple of years. And then when Governor Carey was up for re-election I was recruited out of the Legislature to be involved in the campaign and I left the Commission on a leave of absence to go work in the campaign, the 1978 campaign, and there I got to interact with the union and its leadership around some very interesting issues, one of which was the de-institutionalization of patients.

In that year CSEA was threatening to run a one million dollar ad campaign effectively against Governor Carey's re-election. They hired an actress who they draped in a babushka and the slogan was "Dump Carey not Patients" and it went from there. It actually ended up in a very interesting set of negotiations in which I was a party/non-party. In other words, I had no official position in it but I spent a whole lot of time traversing back and forth between the union and friends and colleagues in State government to work out something that ultimately became known as the Morgado Amendment or Agreement, which actually set
quotas, if you will, on the numbers of people necessary for certain kinds of quality of care, which on one level was quite expensive and on another level probably set a standard, first in the nation, in terms of care for patients.

At the end of that process, and I'm sure there was no correlation between this and a political outcome because that would have been wrong, but the union at that point decided to essentially stay neutral in that election and contributed the maximum to both Governor Carey's re-election as well as to Perry Duryea's campaign.

THE INTERVIEWER: All right. That pretty much connects with a lot of what other people have told us about those circumstances, but there also seems to have been kind of a softening of the position towards the Carey Administration with the Morgado Memorandum, and I think the way folks in CSEA have always looked at that it was kind of with the backdrop of the Willow Brook Consent Decrees and this was a commitment on the part of Governor Carey to try to be more humane in the care for the mentally ill as well as the developmentally disabled.

MR. FRUCHER: Well, I would take issue with the term, you know, be willing to be more humane. I think Governor Carey who personally suffered from incredible personal loss in his
20 lifetime was the epitome of somebody that was humane. The issue was an issue involving the financial stability of the State.
21 One has to recall that Governor Carey entered office in 1975 to a state and a city that was essentially bankrupt, and while the City of New York was saved by his actions, New York State in fact defaulted on some UDC bonds, so poor Governor Carey never governed in an era when he had a whole lot of revenue to do things. The MHMR areas were areas that were very, very close to his heart.
22 The problem with institutional care -- all right, now remember I'm -- this is a quarter of a decade, a quarter of a century away, but the problem was that the Federal reimbursements were not effectively in place to reimburse states for patient care, a hundred percent institutionalized care. However, reimbursements were available in de-mutualized care and so the cost to the State for maintaining an institutionally-based system was horrific.
23 And given the fact that MH and MR were the two largest components of the actual operational State budget, you're talking about massive dollars. And not just in New York State but across the country states were looking for ways of off-loading a significant percentage of the cost of providing humane care to people who were
mentally retarded or mentally ill in a way that would allow the Federal government to pick up legitimately a significant percentage of that cost. So this was a very difficult process. It wasn't a question of humanity versus non-humanity. It was a question of how do you provide quality care and spare the State from bankruptcy.

THE INTERVIEWER: And one of the other things I think needs to be pointed out in this context, too, is that at that particular time within CSEA Mental Hygiene workers made up the largest block of the union membership --

MR. FRUCHER: Oh, yeah.

THE INTERVIEWER: -- so it was a very interesting --

MR. FRUCHER: About 70 percent. That's correct. So it was a very, very contentious issue and it was a very difficult issue.

THE INTERVIEWER: Talk a little bit about the start of the Carey Administration because certainly when we talk about contentious times the Governor's initial thrust with trying to deal with the New York City fiscal crisis certainly created a lot of controversy in Albany and in particular with
the CSEA, and I wonder if you would talk about what
you remember of that dynamic.

MR. FRUCHER: Well, I mean the best
way to describe how Governor Carey came into office
was to use his own words in his inaugural State of
the Union Address. What he said was: The days of
wine and roses are over and, in fact, they were.
Both State and local governments, particularly New
York City government, were teetering on the edge of
fiscal collapse and the revenues that had always
been in the ascent were now going downhill.
So you were dealing with an
environment where a newly-elected Governor with new
ideas and new hopes and aspirations, and
constituents who had hopes and aspirations that
came with -- after 16 years of one-party rule were
looking for initiatives, new ideas, new programs,
new approaches, which tragically are very difficult
to do when you have no resources to do them, so
Governor Carey came in into a very, very difficult
situation.
I don't think anyone had any idea
how close to collapse the City of New York was and,
you know, this is a, you know, to quote John Dunn,
"No man is an island," and the fact is the State
cannot survive without the revenue coming from New
York City. Conversely, New York City cannot
survive without the resources provided by New York
State, and so it was absolutely critical that the
Governor do everything in his power to save New York City.

Unfortunately, in so doing, I think a lot of people at the State level and I think particularly State employees were angered by the fact that in saving New York City and saving jobs in New York City, while Governor Carey I think appropriately held State salaries at zero for two years and ostensibly New York City employees were held to the same standard.

Unfortunately New York City employees had COLAs built into their contracts and New York State employees did not, and so while New York City which was viewed as the epicenter of the financial crisis, their employees while getting zero were in fact getting COLAs. Remember in the seventies inflation was running pretty darn high, so those COLAs were pretty rich. And New York State employees were getting zip, so there was a lot of resentment that was built up around that issue, very understandably on the part of the rank and file of CSEA. Additionally, the same thing was happening in other jurisdictions.

I always, as Director of Employee Relations -- I always felt that I was between a rock and a hard place as well because we had no control over State dollars that were given to local governments by formula, whether as an education
formula or a distribution formula that went to counties as general revenue or whatever, and yet we would negotiate contracts commensurate with our financial needs, but we had nowhere to go.

State and local governments were more generous than the State to its employees because besides or in addition to their own tax base they were getting State Aid, so our money would go to the local governments, their employees would do better, our employees would do worse, and that created, I would say, a difficult if not hostile labor/management relations.

THE INTERVIEWER: Early in 1975 CSEA had a massive demonstration outside the Capitol. I think to this day it's regarded as perhaps the largest gathering, maybe 25- to 30,000 people. Do you remember that event?

MR. FRUCHER: Yeah, although maybe the Spitzer inauguration had more numbers of people outside the steps.

(Laughter.)

THE INTERVIEWER: Could be. Could be.

MR. FRUCHER: I do. I do.

THE INTERVIEWER: What do you remember about it?

MR. FRUCHER: I -- just the enormity of it and what it bespoke.

THE INTERVIEWER: M--m h-m-m. What,
you know, again the relationship with -- Governor Carey had a very difficult task in front of him when he came into office, but he seemed to have a very challenging relationship with CSEA in that first -- in that first term.

MR. FRUCHER: Well, you always do when you're giving out zeroes.

THE INTERVIEWER: Yeah. Yeah. Did you see him work to try to improve it? I mean other than the Morgado Memorandum, which --

MR. FRUCHER: Oh, yes.

THE INTERVIEWER: -- was eventually --

MR. FRUCHER: Well, I was there really for the second term. I was Director of Employee Relations for the second term. We worked very, very hard to try to improve those relationships and I hope, in retrospect, that's how that second term was perceived.

THE INTERVIEWER: M-m h-m-m. One of the things that I think is interesting about the first term of Governor Carey was that at that time CSEA was not part of the AFL-CIO.

MR. FRUCHER: No, they weren't.

THE INTERVIEWER: And there, I think, was always a little bit of suspicion that Governor Carey was squeezing CSEA to see how far he could get with them. I mean did you ever see any
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20 of that or any --
21
22 MR. FRUCHER: No. I think what you saw -- I think there were two dynamics there.
23 Number one is, you know, just the opposite. I think Governor Carey cared about the employees. He
24 just didn't have very much money to give out, so that was, you know, when you are the direct
25 employer you are the person who says yea or nay, and so in addition to the impact of a negotiation
26 on the State's direct budget, the State has a responsibility of leadership.
27 And so when you're trying to get local governments to be responsive, fiscally responsive, you're not in a position to give out a whole lot of largesse. I mean you're being watched very, very carefully because people all the way down the line are gonna look at your contracts and try to use 'em as benchmarks. So, you know, it's not an easy task.
28
29 Second, the issue of AFL-CIO affiliation or membership had nothing to do with how CSEA was viewed in Albany. However, CSEA was viewed in Albany as an Upstate union and Upstate in those days tended to be even more Republican than they are today, and so the demographic of the State work force really reflected more of the geography than the philosophy of the labor movement.
30
31 THE INTERVIEWER: Sure. So then tell us a little bit about when you went over to
GOER, how your relations with CSEA changed. I mean earlier you talked about having some non-starters when you'd come to talk to them about ideas. When you were actually at GOER and formally doing negotiations did that dynamic change?

MR. FRUCHER: I hope so. I think so. When I went over to be the Director of Employee Relations, first of all, it was -- there was no one more shocked at being asked to be the Director of Employee Relations than I was. It started with a conversation I had. I was summoned to Bob Morgado's office and I was asked if I wanted to be the Director of Employee Relations. I was thirty years old. I didn't know, you know, one side of a bargaining table from the other.

I had never been in a collective bargaining session in my life. I'd been in some different kinds of negotiations but never in a formal collective bargaining session, and what did I know? I mean I had no idea of the formality of the process.

Morgado said, you know, you know the issues. You understand both sides of the issues. You know, we've noted that you tend to be somewhat creative from the stuff you were talking about at
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the Commission. They seem to like you even though
they've rejected most of your ideas, and we have a
problem.

What's the problem? Well, the
previous Director of Employee Relations, who was
about to begin a full set of negotiations with all
of the unions, all the contracts were up,
tragically was sitting in front of his television
and a blood vessel popped in his eye and he lost
his sight in the eye and he had to resign, and so
the State literally was days away from opening up a
full range of collective bargaining and, you know,
they sort of looked around and they said, you know,
who can go to the table.

THE INTERVIEWER: M-m-m.

MR. FRUCHER: And there I was, so
Morgado said to me: Will you take it? I said: I
don't know, Bob. It's kind of crazy, and he said:
I think you'd do well at it. I think, you know,
it'd be good for you, good for the State, and even
good for the union. So he said: Would you go tell
the deputy who's the acting director that you're
gonna be replacing him?

(Laughter.)

MR. FRUCHER: I said: Are you
kidding? He said: No. So I trundled over and sat
down with the gentleman and I gave him the news
and, to his credit, he looked at me and he said:
Can I keep the car? and I said yes. So I called
Bob and I said -- he said how did it go and I said, you know, he was very disappointed, you know, that was his dream, but I said he recovered quickly and he asked for the car and I said he could keep the car, and Morgado said: You said what?

I said he could keep the car. He said: Oh, my God. I hope that doesn't portend ill for the future.

(Laughter.)

MR. FRUCHER: He said you can't give away cars. In fact you can't give away anything, so that was my introduction. I remember going to my first session and I sat there and I heard the presentation of demands and my colleague, who had the aspirations, was sitting next to me and he said just watch the way I do this.

And as the union was presenting its demands he was going, shaking his head, yes,

m-m h-m-m, m-m h-m-m, and I'm lookin' at him.

Finally I think it was Billy McGowan looked across the table and he said are you agreeing with our demands because you seem to be shaking your head yes. And this fellow Jim said no, so the union said well, then, why are you shaking your head yes?

He said, well, yes means I hear you.

So I said to myself, oh, my God. There's a whole code here that I don't really know.

In fact, there was a whole lot of code that I
didn't know and I tried to change both dynamic and the structure of the negotiations.

We then moved negotiations from this big room into a conference room and we tried to get a ball rolling on the negotiations and CSEA, because of both geographic diversity and just the sheer size had very, very large -- very, very large bargaining committees.

THE INTERVIEWER: Right.

MR. FRUCHER: And I noted that the folks, you know, would come in, the mornings would be productive. Then people would go out to lunch and then they'd come back after lunch and it wasn't quite as productive as it had been in the morning,

so I came up with a strategy. I went over to Billy McGowan and Jim Roemer and Jimmy Featherstonhaugh and I said: Look, we have to keep the folks in to get stuff goin' here, and they said well, what do you suggest?

I said your folks get a lunch allowance. They can keep their lunch allowance; I'll buy lunch and we'll cater lunch, and they said, oh, okay. So -- well, actually they went back to the Committee and the Committee said okay, so we started catering the lunches. There was a big, heavy fellow on my staff who appeared to, at least on the surface, appeared to understand food and so I charged him with catering the lunches, and after two days a couple of the guys from the
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16 Department of Transportation came over to me and  
17 they said, you know, Sand, we's really love the  
18 idea about these lunches, but you gotta get rid of  
19 this tabbouleh crap. We's meat-and-potatoes guys.  
20 (Laughter.)  
21 MR. FRUCHER: So we shifted away  
22 from tabbouleh and went to meat and potatoes.  
23 THE INTERVIEWER: To this day it's  
24 always an issue over the salad, too --

1  MR. FRUCHER: That's right.  
2  THE INTERVIEWER: -- but it still  
3 kind of applies.  
4 So talk a little bit about the  
5 dynamic of dealing with this large group, too,  
6 though, because I know when Jim Roemer sat in with  
7 us he'd talk about having like this 75-member  
8 negotiating team --  
9 MR. FRUCHER: Oh, gosh, yes.  
10 THE INTERVIEWER: -- and his biggest  
11 job was trying to find consensus in the caucus.  
12 MR. FRUCHER: That always is the  
13 biggest problem and the union leadership who are  
14 sitting at the table really have to represent the  
15 aspirations of all of the members. Of course, the  
16 members are sitting right behind their back so, you  
17 know, a lot of it is theater and, you know, we'd go  
18 back and forth and what you do in any negotiation  
19 is you have a lot of off lines. You know,
sometimes the off lines are structured. You know, you can do it before the meetings, you can do it after the meetings or you can do it somewhere, but sometimes they occur in the crucible of the moment. In those moments you use code, like you stretch out and you say, I think I need a break to go to the bathroom, and then everybody runs out and whoever is trying to make the deal will meet in the bathroom or something. So you'd have a lot of those moments, but at the end of the day we'd go back and forth with counterproposals and when each side would move or present a proposal or counter-proposal, then generally you would talk it through and explain it and then you would caucus. Frequently we'd go upstairs to our office because we have a meeting room on the floor below our office, a big conference room, that would fit all of those people. But one of the things that happened, that was pre the anti-smoking laws days, and for anyone who knew Bill McGowan, they knew that some people in their lives needed to hold their Linus blanket or their teddy bear. Bill needed to have his cigar in his mouth, and so to this day, you know, when I need to -- a pickup for whatever reason, I would think of Billy McGowan sittin' there with this humongous cigar in his mouth and he'd listen to you and he'd pull the cigar out and he'd lean across the table and he'd say -- he'd take the cigar out, (sound of
exhaling smoke), blow the smoke across the table, and he'd say, you stalkin' my people.

(Laughter.)

THE INTERVIEWER: My peeps.

MR. FRUCHER: Then he'd put the cigar back in his mouth. So after suffering through months and months of this we came up with a strategy where we got the biggest cigars we could get and all of the people on the front row of our table had their cigars ready and after a particularly contentious back and forth --

THE INTERVIEWER: M-m h-m-m.

MR. FRUCHER: -- I leaned across the table and I said: I am not gonna take any more of this, you know. You have, you know, done this and you've done that and you've insulted us and you've questioned our integrity and our honesty and our sincerity and we're simply not gonna take this any more. At which point everybody pulled out their cigars, we lit 'em, inhaled (laughter) and blew it across the table and there was a moment of dead silence and you didn't know which way it was gonna go, and then everybody broke out into laughter and the moment was saved and we were able to then proceed, so there were some great moments.
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THE INTERVIEWER: One of the things
that seems to be a hallmark of that era in the
State/CSEA relations is the idea of a labor/
management committee.

MR. FRUCHER: Absolutely.

THE INTERVIEWER: Is that how you
were able to bring forward a lot of your ideas?

MR. FRUCHER: Well, that's what I
presented. I presented -- you know, one of the
things that I had been looking at and studying was
the whole question of labor/management committees,
and to be very honest, as Director of Employee
Relations, a new Director of Employee Relations,
who was able to think out of the box because I
didn't know what the box was. I mean one of the
advantages and disadvantages of having limited
experience was I didn't have to play by the rules.
I didn't know the rules, so I could make the rules.

Now, the structure of collective
bargaining in any organization, but particularly in
New York State, was that the Director of Employee
Relations structurally was, for lack of a better
term, a eunuch. You had no independent authority
except on -- during marginal detail, and like in
the Kremlin, if you ever left, you know, the
Politbureau, there's be a person in a rayon suit
with a very narrow tie sitting either next to you
or certainly within eyesight and if you ever
deviated from the script, you know, would be
prepared to take out his gun and shoot you.

So, you know, it was clear to me that, you know, yeah, you know, you had very clear budget constraints, particularly in this era when there was a downward trend on revenues as opposed to an increased trend on revenues.

And the other thing I noticed was that in between negotiations GOER was an orphan, that your entire life was limited to a series of contentious issues and disciplinary arbitrations and your ability to effect anything or to do anything was quite narrow. By personality I have a lot of trouble with boredom so I didn't really want to live that way and coming from where I came from, which was the State Commission on Management and Productivity, and my own background I wanted to make government work and I knew that the vehicle to do that was to work with the employees.

So I understood that when you negotiated a contract, the contract had to go up or down on both sides. There wasn't line item deals. So in order to make myself relevant in my office, and in order to make the union's ability to effect various things relevant, between contracts we created the Quality of Work Life Committee. We worked on it very hard to make sure it was substantive and by the time I left each of those committees had about $10 million in it to do a
variety of things, so that if you felt that in an institution there were particular tensions over whatever the issue was, there'd be some resource without having -- the Director of Employee Relations wouldn't have to go on his or her knees, you know, to the Budget Director, who would be instinctively primed to say no, but you'd have a fund in which you could effect change with in joint labor/management agreement.

So that, you know, when we found that there was an institution or prison in which there was a lot of tension and the tension could be alleviated by just simply providing a space for employees to go and decompress, we were able to set up such a space.

I was a firm believer in day care. The State of New York in three contracts before me had put day care as an objective, as a goal, but not as a specific commitment. I went to the CSEA and I said, look, I really want to do something about day care and they said, good, it's about time. I said -- and they said, well, how do you want to go about it?

I said I want to go about it by taking it out of the contract and they said, what, are you crazy? And I said, no. I said I don't believe the kids should be designated by bargaining units, so I want it out of the contract.

Now with these quick committees that
we're setting up, we will create a program by which we can set up on-site day care. When I left there were 32 on-site day care centers across New York State. It was the largest -- there were more on-site day care in New York State than in any other company in America. We had 32 of them and that's because we were able to work side by side, we were able to fund groups of employees who wanted to put together day care co-operatives in the institutions. The State provided the space, the State provided the insurance coverage and the State, at the end of the day, was willing to provide the start-up money for the groups and then the employees would cover the ongoing expenses, but it was able to be done at a very, very low minimum rate.

So we were able to think out of the box. We were able to do things that had never been done before, sometimes by taking things out of the contract as opposed to putting things into the contract.

THE INTERVIEWER: And you found CSEA receptive to work with you on this approach.

MR. FRUCHER: Absolutely. You know, I found CSEA always willing to work with you on something that had merit. Now on the other hand, sometimes you could be too successful, and one of my most successful tragedies was convincing the
union and the bargaining unit to accept performance
evaluation. Performance evaluation, the motivator
and the driver, obviously, from management's point
of view was to introduce something into the Civil
Service structure that related to performance.

Now, I said then and I'll say now, one of the limitations of public employment,
particularly in a work force that is 95 percent
unionized and 2 1/2 percent of the remaining
5 percent are managerial and confidential and
professional, and therefore you have a very, very,
very limited narrow managerial strain and the
private sector in the most labor-intensive
industries, no more than 50 percent of your work
force are organized. In the public sector it's
95 percent.

That means that effectively you have
very limited or no management. Now that may sound
like heaven to some people but, in fact, at the end
of the day for workers it's hell because it's very
-- you know, frequently it's very difficult to get,
you know, appropriate direction.

Well, that was the year that
President Carter tried to eliminate inflation by
eliminating collective bargaining agreements and
capping them and we said, well, we can go above
that cap but it had to be performance based, so we
threw an extra one percent in for the contract but
that one percent had to be allocated based on
1 performance and thus was born the bell-shaped curve
2 or at least the recognition of what the bell-shaped curve was, as opposed to every other agreement
3 where the pool would be allocated evenly amongst employees.
4
5 This was the first attempt to differentiate employees by performance and everybody could not be awarded the money and everybody who got it had to be at the tail of that bell-shaped curve. Well, when we got the first round evaluations everybody was excellent. It was an amazing thing. We had so many excellent employees, so we sent it back and said, well, amongst the excellent employees there has to be a bell-shaped curve.
6
7 Well, hell broke loose and one got a very clear understanding of why the union mantra is all for one and one for all and that within the union context understandably, by definition, the union meant that to start to distinguish was a concept that was antithetical to the fundamental principal of what the union was. Not that the union is opposed to excellence or opposed to various forms of differentiation, but as a union
8
9 it's a very, very difficult thing to accede to
because if 10 percent of your employees are truly excellent, it's gonna be very hard to explain to the other 90 percent why they aren't excellent too because they believe they are.

And so by the time we were through with the implementation of our performance evaluation program I had the union begging to give back the money and just call the whole thing to a halt, so I learned a whole lot of lessons in that and I think so did the union; that sometimes something that looks right and may even be right in certain environments is impossible to impose in a -- in this kind of environment.

I think the collective bargaining in New York State was flawed by a mentality that felt that any kind of political decision-making was fundamentally corrupt and that the only thing that could protect employees was not just collective bargaining but collective bargaining imposed on top of the Civil Service System, and that makes it very, very difficult to have a traditional kind of effective or efficient managerial structure. You have no managers and it's very, very difficult.

It's very, very difficult.

THE INTERVIEWER: I know your time is limited, so let me ask one final question and that is: Why do you think CSEA has been able to survive for a hundred years?

MR. FRUCHER: Well, I mean I think
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7 CSEA has survived for a hundred years. From time to time it's lost certain, you know, units like, you know, the managerial unit, the supervisory unit. I think basically because the union works very, very hard to represent its employees well. The people who I met who work for the union were first-rate people. People who transcended the doctrinaire. In other words, they had a job to do to represent employees but they're always willing to look at the end product. They were always willing to understand that government is about public service, and so they were -- they lived in both worlds and they did a good job of representing both worlds, and I think that as long as the union remembers it's a union and remembers that it's employees represent the public as well, that this is about government and government is about service to the people, that it can do well and CSEA has

done well for that reason.

It's represented its workers well and it's represented the public interest well.

THE INTERVIEWER: Sandy, thank you very much. We really appreciate you taking the time.

MR. FRUCHER: I hope I --

(The interview of Meyer (Sandy) Frucher was concluded.)

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