PLOTINUS
(205-270)
ENNEADES
Translated from the Greek* by
THOMAS TAYLOR
I. ON THE VIRTUES
(I. ii.)
I. Since evils are here, and revolve from necessity about this [terrestrial] place, but the soul wishes to fly from evils, it is requisite to fly from hence. What therefore is the flight? To become similar, says Plato, to God. But this will be effected, if we become just and holy, in conjunction with [intellectual] prudence, and in short if we are [truly] virtuous. If therefore we are assimilated through virtue, is it to one who possesses virtue? But to whom are we assimilated? To divinity. Are we then assimilated to that nature which appears to possess the virtues in a more eminent degree, and also to the soul of the world, and to the intellect which is the leader in it, in which there is an admirable wisdom? For it is reasonable to suppose that while we are here, we are assimilated to this intellect. Or is it not in the first place dubious, whether all the virtues are present with this intellect, such as temperance and fortitude, since there is nothing which can be dreadful to it? For nothing externally happens to it, nor does any thing pleasing approach to it, which when not present it may become desirous of possessing, or apprehending. But if it also has an appetite directed to the intelligibles, after which our souls aspire, it is evident that ornament and the virtues are from thence derived to us. Has therefore this intellect these virtues? Or may we not say, it is not reasonable to suppose, that it possesses what are called the political virtues, viz. prudence indeed, about the part that deliberates and consults; fortitude about the

irascible part; temperance, in the agreement and concord of the
part that desires, with the reasoning power; and justice, in each
of these parts performing its proper office, with respect to gov-
erning and being governed. Shall we say therefore, that we are
not assimilated to divinity according to the political virtues, but
according to greater virtues which employ the same appellation?
But if according to others, are we not at all assimilated according
to the political virtues? Or is it not absurd that we should not
in any respect be assimilated according to these? For rumour
also says, that these are divine. We must say, therefore, that we
are after a manner assimilated by them; but that the assimila-
tion is according to the greater virtues. In either way, however,
it happens that divinity has virtues, though not such as the pol-
itical.

If, therefore, some one should grant, that though it is not pos-
sible to be assimilated according to such virtues as these, since
we subsist differently with reference to other virtues, yet nothing
hinders but that we by our virtues may be assimilated to that
which does not possess virtue. But after what manner? Thus,
if any thing is heated by the presence of heat, it is necessary that
also should be hot from whence the heat is derived. And if any
thing is hot by the presence of fire, it is necessary that fire itself
also should be hot by the presence of heat. To the first of these
assertions, however, it may be said, that there is heat in fire, but
a connascent heat, so that it will follow from analogy, that vir-
tue is indeed adventitious to the soul, but connascent with that
nature from whence it is derived by imitation. And with respect
to the argument from fire, it may be said that divinity possesses
virtue, but that virtue in him is in reality greater than virtue
[because it subsists causally]. But if that virtue indeed, of
which the soul participates, was the same with that from which
it is derived, it would be necessary to speak in this manner. Now,
however, the one is different from the other. For neither is the
sensible the same with the intelligible house [or with that which
is the object of intellectual conception], though it is similar to it.
And the sensible house participates of order and ornament;

1 For πυρος θερμος here, I read θερμοςθερμος.
though there is neither order, nor ornament, nor symmetry, in
the productive principle of it in the mind. Thus, therefore, we
participate from thence [i. e. from divinity] of ornament, order
and consent, and these things pertain to virtue, but there con-
sent, ornament and order are not wanted, and therefore divinity
has no need of virtue. We are, however, nevertheless assimilated
to what he possesses, through the presence of virtue. And thus
much for the purpose of showing, that it is not necessary virtue
should be there, though we are assimilated to divinity by virtue.
But it is also necessary to introduce persuasion to what has been
said, and not to be satisfied with compulsion alone.

II. In the first place, therefore, the virtues must be assumed,
according to which we say that we are assimilated [to divinity],
in order that we may discover the same thing. For that which is
virtue with us, being an imitation, is there an archetype as it were,
and not virtue. By which we signify that there is a twofold simili-
tude, one of which requires a sameness in the things that are
similar, these being such as are equally assimilated from the same
thing; but the other being that in which one thing is assimilated
to another, but the latter ranks as first, and is not converted to
the other, nor is said to be similar to it. Here, therefore, the
similitude must be assumed after another manner; since we do
not require the same, but rather another form, the assimilation
being effected after a different manner. What, therefore, is vir-
tue, both that which is universal, and that which is particular?
The discussion, however, will be more manifest by directing our
attention to each of the virtues; for thus that which is common,
according to which all of them are virtues, will be easily apparent.
The political virtues, therefore, of which we have spoken above,
truly adorn and render us better, bounding and moderating the
desires, and in short the passions, and taking away false opin-
ions from a more excellent nature, by limiting and placing the
soul beyond the immoderate and indefinite, and by themselves
receiving measure and bound. Perhaps, too, these measures are
in soul as in matter, are assimilated to the measure which is in
divinity, and possess a vestige of the best which is there. For that
which is in every respect deprived of measure, being matter, is
entirely dissimilar to divinity. But so far as it receives form, so far it is assimilated to him who is without form. But things which are nearer to divinity, participate of him in a greater degree. Soul, however, is nearer to, and more allied to him than body, and therefore participates of him more abundantly, so that appearing as a God, it deceives us, and causes us to doubt whether the whole of it is not divine. After this manner, therefore, these are assimilated.

III. Since, however, Plato indicates that this similitude to God pertains to a greater virtue [than that which is political], let us speak concerning it; in which discussion also, the essence of political virtue will become more manifest, and likewise the virtue which is essentially more excellent, which will in short be found to be different from that which is political. Plato, therefore, when he says that a similitude to God is a flight from terrestrial concerns, and when besides this he does not admit that the virtues belonging to a polity are simply virtues, but adds to them the epithet political, and elsewhere calls all the virtues purifications, evidently admits that the virtues are twofold, and that a similitude to divinity is not effected according to political virtue. How, therefore, do we call these purifications? And how being purified, are we especially assimilated to divinity? Shall we say, that since the soul is in an evil condition when mingled with the body, becoming similarly passive and concurring in opinion with it in all things, it will be good and possess virtue, if it neither consents with the body, but energizes alone (and this is to perceive intellectually and to be wise), nor is similarly passive with it (and this is to be temperate), nor dreads a separation from the body (and this is to possess fortitude), but reason and intellect are the leaders (and this will be justice). If any one, however, calls this disposition of the soul, according to which it perceives intellectually, and is thus impassive, a resemblance of God, he will not err. For divinity is pure, and the energy is of such a kind, that the being which imitates it will possess wisdom. What then? Is not divinity also disposed after this manner? Or may we not say that he is not, but that the disposition pertains to the soul; and that soul perceives intellectually, in a way dif-
different from divinity? It may also be said, that of the things which subsist with him, some subsist differently from what they do with us, and others are not at all with him. Again, therefore, is intellectual perception with him and us homonymous? By no means; but the one is primary, and that which is derived from him secondary. For as the discourse which is in voice is an imitation of that which is in the soul, so likewise, that which is in the soul, is an imitation of that which is in something else [i.e. in intellect]. As, therefore, external discourse is divided and distributed, when compared to that which is in the soul, thus also that which is in the soul, and which is the interpreter of intellectual discourse, is divided when compared with it. Virtue, however, pertains to the soul; but not to intellect, nor to that which is beyond intellect.

VI. . . . Each of the virtues, however, is twofold; for each is both in the intellect and in the soul. And in intellect, indeed, each is not [properly] virtue, but virtue is in soul. What, then, is it in intellect? The energy of intellect, and that which is. But here that which is in another, is virtue derived from thence. For justice itself, and each of the virtues, are not in intellect such as they are here, but they are as it were paradigms. But that which proceeds from each of these into the soul, is virtue. For virtue pertains to a certain thing. But each thing itself pertains to itself, and not to any thing else. With respect to justice, however, if it is the performance of appropriate duty, does it always consist in a multitude of parts? Or does not one kind consist in multitude, when there are many parts of it, but the other is entirely the performance of appropriate duty, though it should be one thing. True justice itself, therefore, is the energy of one thing towards itself, in which there is not another and another. Hence justice in the soul is to energize in a greater degree intellectually. But temperance is an inward conversion to intellect. And fortitude is apathy, according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. But soul is impassive from virtue, in order that she may not sympathize with her subordinate associate.

VII. These virtues, therefore, follow each other in the soul,
in the same manner as those paradigms in intellect which are prior to virtue. For there intelligence is wisdom and science; a conversion to itself is temperance; its proper work is the performance of its appropriate duty, and justice; and that which is as it were fortitude is immateriality, and an abiding with purity in itself. In soul, therefore, perception directed to intellect is wisdom and prudence, which are the virtues of the soul. For soul does not possess these in the same manner as intellect. Other things also follow after, similarly in soul. They are likewise consequent to purification, since all the virtues are purifications, and necessarily consist in the soul being purified; for otherwise, no one of them would be perfect. And he indeed, who possesses the greater virtues, has necessarily the less in capacity; but he who possesses the less, has not necessarily the greater. This, therefore, is the life which is the principal and leading aim of a worthy man. But whether he possesses in energy, or in some other way, the less or the greater virtues, must be considered by a survey of each of them; as for instance, of prudence. For if it uses the other virtues, how can it any longer remain what it is? And if also it should not energize? Likewise, it must be considered whether naturally the virtues proceed to a different extent; and this temperance measures, but that entirely takes away what is superfluous. And in a similar manner in the other virtues, prudence being wholly excited. Or perhaps the worthy man will see to what extent they proceed. And perhaps sometimes according to circumstances he will energize according to some of them. But arriving at the greater virtues, he will perform other measures according to them. Thus, for instance, in the exercise of temperance, he will not measure it by political temperance, but in short he will separate himself as much as possible [from the body], and will live, not merely the life of a good man, which political virtue thinks fit to enjoin, but leaving this, he will choose another life, namely, that of the Gods. For the similitude is to these, and not to good men. The similitude, indeed, to good men, is an assimilation of one image to another, each being derived from the same thing; but a similitude to God, is an assimilation as to a paradigm.
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XV. ON THE GOOD, OR THE ONE

(VI. ix.)

III. What then will the one be; and what nature will it possess? Or may we not say that it is not at all wonderful, it should not be easy to tell what it is, since neither is it easy to tell what being is, or what form is. But our knowledge is fixed in forms. When, however, the soul directs its attention to that which is formless, then being unable to comprehend that which is not bounded, and as it were impressed with forms by a former of a various nature, it falls from the apprehension of it, and is afraid it will possess [nothing from the view]. Hence, it becomes weary in endeavours of this kind, and gladly descends from the survey frequently falling from all things, till it arrives at something sensible, and as it were rests in a solid substance; just as the sight also, when wearied with the perception of small objects, eagerly converts itself to such as are large. When, however, the soul wishes to perceive by itself, and sees itself alone, then in consequence of being one with the object of its perception, it does not think that it yet possesses that which it investigates, because it is not different from that which it intellectually perceives: At the same time, it is requisite that he should act in this manner, who intends to philosophize about the one. Since, therefore, that which we investigate is one, and we direct our attention to the principle of all things, to the good, and the first, we ought not to be far removed from the natures which are about the first of things, nor fall from them to the last of all things, but proceeding to such as are first, we should elevate ourselves from sensibles which have an ultimate subsistence. The soul, likewise, should for this purpose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of hastening to the [vision of the] good; and should ascend to the principle which is in herself, and become one instead of many things, in order that she may survey the principle of all things, and the one.

It is requisite, therefore, that the soul of him who ascends to the good should then become intellect, and that he should com-
mit his soul to, and establish it in intellect, in order, that what intellect sees, his soul may vigilantly receive, and may through intellect survey the one; not employing any one of the senses, nor receiving anything from them, but with a pure intellect, and with the summit [and as it were, flower] of intellect, beholding that which is most pure. When, therefore, he who applies himself to the survey of a thing of this kind, imagines that there is either magnitude, or figure, or bulk about this nature, he has not intellect for the leader of the vision; because intellect is not naturally adapted to perceive things of this kind, but such an energy is the energy of sense, and of opinion following sense. But in order to perceive the one, it is necessary to receive from intellect a declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish. Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things effected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself, are pure; but those prior to itself are still purer and more simple; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is not intellect, but something more excellent. For intellect is a certain one among the number of beings; but that is not a certain one, but is prior to every thing. Nor is it being; for being has, as it were, the form of the one. But that is formless, and is even without intelligible form. For the nature of the one being generative of all things, is not any one of them. Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor that which is moved, nor again that which stands still. Nor is it in place, or in time; but is by itself uniform, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and to permanency.

IV. In this affair, however, a doubt especially arises, because the perception of the highest God is not effected by science, nor by intelligence, like other intelligibles, but by the presence of him, which is a mode of knowledge superior to that of science. But the soul suffers an apostasy from the one, and is not entirely one when it receives scientific knowledge. For science is reason, and reason is multitudinous. The soul, therefore, in this case, deviates from the one, and falls into number and multitude. Hence it is necessary to run above science, and in no respect to depart
from a subsistence which is profoundly one; but it is requisite to
abandon science, the objects of science, every other thing, and
every beautiful spectacle. For every thing beautiful is posterior
to the supreme, and is derived from him, in the same manner as
all diurnal light is derived from the sun. Hence Plato says, he
is neither effable, nor to be described by writing. We speak how-
ever, and write about him, extending ourselves to him, and ex-
citing others by a reasoning process to the vision of him; pointing
out, as it were, the way to him who wishes to behold something
[of his ineffable nature]. For doctrine extends as far as to the
way and the progression to him. But the vision of him is now
the work of one who is solicitous to perceive him. He, however,
will not arrive at the vision of him, and will not be affected by
the survey, nor will have in himself as it were an amatory passion
from the view (which passion causes the lover to rest in the ob-
ject of his love), nor receive from it a true light, which surrounds
the whole soul with its splendour, in consequence of becoming
nearer to it; he, I say, will not behold this light, who attempts to
ascend to the vision of the supreme while he is drawn downwards
by those things which are an impediment to the vision. He will
likewise not ascend by himself alone, but will be accompanied
by that which will divulge him from the one, or rather he will not
be himself collected into one. For the one is not absent from any
thing, and yet is separated from all things; so that it is present,
and yet not present with them. But it is present with those
things that are able, and are prepared to receive it, so that they
become congruous, and as it were pass into contact with it,
through similitude and a certain inherent power allied to that
which is imparted by the one. When, therefore, the soul is dis-
posed in such a way as she was when she came from the one, then
she is able to perceive it, as far as it is naturally capable of being
seen. He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither, but either on
account of the above-mentioned obstacle is deprived of this vision,
or through the want of reason which may conduct him to it, and
impair faith respecting it; such a one may consider himself as
the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and
should endeavour by separating himself from all things to be alone.
VI. How, therefore, can we speak of the one, and how can we adapt it to intellectual conception? Shall we say that this may be accomplished, by admitting that it is more transcendently one than the monad and a point? For in these, indeed, the soul, taking away magnitude and the multitude of number, ends in that which is smallest, and fixes itself in a certain thing which is indeed indivisible, but which was in a divisible nature, and is in something different from itself. But the one is neither in another thing, nor in that which is divisible. Nor is it indivisible in the same way as that which is smallest. For it is the greatest of all things, not in magnitude, but in power. So that it is without magnitude in power. For the natures also which are [immediately] posterior to it, are indivisible in powers, and not in bulk. The principle of all things likewise must be admitted to be infinite, not because he is magnitude or number which cannot be passed over, but because the power of him is incomprehensible. For when you conceive him to be intellect or God, he is more [excellent] than these. And again, when by the dianoetic power you equalize him with the one, or conceive him to be God, by recurring to that which is most united in your intellectual perception, he even transcends these appellations. For he is in himself, nor is any thing accidental to him. By that which is sufficient to itself also the unity of his nature may be demonstrated. For it is necessary that the principle of all things should be most sufficient both to other things, and to itself, and that it should also be most indigent. But every thing which is multitudinous and not one, is indigent; since consisting of many things it is not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be one. But the one is not in want of itself. For it is the one. Moreover, that which is many, is in want of as many things as it is. And each of the things that are in it, as it subsists in conjunction with others, and is not in itself, is indigent of other things; and thus a thing of this kind exhibits indigence, both according to parts and according to the whole.

If, therefore, it is necessary there should be something which is most sufficient to itself, it is necessary there should be the one, which alone is a thing of such a kind, as neither to be indigent with reference to itself, nor with reference to another thing. For
it does not seek after any thing in order that it may be, nor in order that it may be in an excellent condition, nor that it may be there established. For being the cause of existence to other things, and not deriving that which it is from others, nor its happiness, what addition can be made to it external to itself? Hence its happiness, or the excellency of its condition, is not accidental to it. For it is itself [all that is sufficient to itself]. There is not likewise any place for it. For it is not in want of a foundation, as if it were not able to sustain itself. For that which is established in another thing is inanimate, and a falling mass, if it is without a foundation. But other things are established on account of the one, through which also they at the same time subsist, and have the place in which they are arranged. That, however, which seeks after place is indigent. But the principle is not indigent of things posterior to itself. The principle, therefore, of all things is unindigent of all things. For that which is indigent, is indigent in consequence of aspiring after its principle. But if the one was indigent of any thing it would certainly seek not to be the one; so that it would be indigent of its destroyer. Every thing, however, which is said to be indigent, is indigent of a good condition, and of that which preserves it. Hence to the one nothing is good, and, therefore, neither is the wish for any thing good to it. But it is super-good. And it is not good to itself, but to other things, which are able to participate of it. Nor does the one possess intelligence, lest it should also possess difference; nor motion. For it is prior to motion and prior to intelligence. For what is there which it will intellectually perceive? Shall we say itself? Prior to intellection, therefore, it will be ignorant, and will be in want of intelligence in order that it may know itself, though it is sufficient to itself. It does not follow, however, that because the one does not know itself, and does not intellectually perceive itself, there will be ignorance in it. For ignorance takes place where there is diversity, and when one thing is ignorant of another. That, however, which is alone neither knows any thing, nor has any thing of which it is ignorant. But being one, and associating with itself, it does not require the intellectual perception of itself; since neither is it necessary, in order that you
may preserve the one, to adapt to it an association with itself. But it is requisite to take away intellectual perception, an association with itself, and the knowledge of itself, and of other things. For it is not proper to arrange it according to the act of perceiving intellectually, but rather according to intelligence. For intelligence does not perceive intellectually, but is the cause of intellectual perception to another thing. Cause, however, is not the same with the thing caused. But the cause of all things is not any one of them. Hence neither must it be denominated that good which it imparts to others; but it is after another manner the good, in a way transcending other goods.

IX. . . . The soul, therefore, when in a condition conformable to nature, loves God, wishing to be united to him, being as it were the desire of a beautiful virgin to be conjoined with a beautiful Love. When, however, the soul descends into generation, then being as it were deceived by [spurious] nuptials, and associating herself with another and a mortal Love, she becomes petulant and insolent through being absent from her father. But when she again hates terrene wantonness and injustice, and becomes purified from the defilements which are here, and again returns to her father, then she is affected in the most felicitous manner. And those indeed who are ignorant of this affection, may from terrene love form some conjecture of divine love, by considering how great a felicity the possession of a most beloved object is conceived to be; and also by considering that these earthly objects of love are mortal and noxious, that the love of them is nothing more than the love of images, and that they lose their attractive power because they are not truly desirable, nor our real good, nor that which we investigate. In the intelligible world, however, the true object of love is to be found, with which we may be conjoined, which we may participate, and truly possess, and which is not externally enveloped with flesh. He however who knows this, will know what I say, and will be convinced that the soul has then another life. The soul also proceeding to, and having now arrived at the desired end, and participating of deity, will know that the supplier of true life is then present. She will likewise then require nothing farther; for on the contrary,
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it will be requisite to lay aside other things, to stop in this alone, and to become this alone, amputating every thing else with which she is surrounded. Hence, it is necessary to hasten our departure from hence, and to be indignant that we are bound in one part of our nature, in order that with the whole of our [true] selves, we may fold ourselves about divinity, and have no part void of contact with him. When this takes place therefore, the soul will both see divinity and herself, as far as it is lawful for her to see him. And she will see herself indeed illuminated, and full of intelligible light; or rather, she will perceive herself to be a pure light, unburthened, agile, and becoming to be a God, or rather being a God, and then shining forth as such to the view. But if she again becomes heavy, she then as it were wastes away.

X. How does it happen, therefore, that the soul does not abide there? Is it not because she has not yet wholly migrated from hence? But she will then, when her vision of deity possesses an uninterrupted continuity, and she is no longer impeded or disturbed in her intuition by the body. That however which sees divinity, is not the thing which is disturbed, but something else; when that which perceives him is at rest from the vision. But it is not then at rest according to a scientific energy, which consists in demonstrations, in credibilities, and a discursive process of the soul. For here vision, and that which sees, are no longer reason, but greater than and prior to reason. And in reason, indeed, they are as that is which is perceived. He therefore who sees himself, will then, when he sees, behold himself to be such a thing as this, or rather he will be present with himself thus disposed, and becoming simple, will perceive himself to be a thing of this kind. Perhaps, however, neither must it be said that he sees, but that he is the thing seen; if it is necessary to call these two things, i.e. the percever and the thing perceived. But both are one; though it is bold to assert this. Then, indeed, the soul neither sees, nor distinguishes by seeing, nor imagines that there are two things; but becomes as it were another thing, and not itself. Nor does that which pertains to itself contribute any thing there. But becoming wholly absorbed in deity, she is one, conjoining as it were centre with centre. For here concurring, they
are one; but they are then two when they are separate. For thus also we now denominate that which is another. Hence this spectacle is a thing difficult to explain by words. For how can any one narrate that as something different from himself, which when he sees he does not behold as different, but as one with himself?

XI. This, therefore, is manifested by the mandate of the mysteries, which orders that they shall not be divulged to those who are uninitiated. For as that which is divine cannot be unfolded to the multitude, this mandate forbids the attempt to elucidate it to anyone but him who is fortunately able to perceive it. Since, therefore, [in this conjunction with deity] there were not two things, but the perceiver was one with the thing perceived, as not being [properly speaking] vision but union; whoever becomes one by mingling with deity, and afterwards recollects this union, will have with himself an image of it. But he was also himself one, having with respect to himself no difference, nor with respect to other things. For then there was not any thing excited with him who had ascended thither; neither anger, nor the desire of any thing else, nor reason, nor a certain intellectual perception, nor, in short, was even he himself moved, if it be requisite also to assert this; but being as it were in an ecstasy, or energizing enthusiastically, he became established in quiet and solitary union, not at all deviating from his own essence, nor revolving about himself, but being entirely stable, and becoming as it were stability itself. Neither was he then excited by any thing beautiful; but running above the beautiful, he passed beyond even the choir of the virtues. Just as if some one having entered into the interior of the adytum should leave behind all the statues in the temple, which on his departure from the adytum will first present themselves to his view, after the inward spectacle, and the association that was there, which was not with a statue or an image, but with the thing itself [which the images represent], and which necessarily become the second objects of his perception. Perhaps, however, this was not a spectacle, but there was another mode of vision, viz. ecstasy, and an expansion and accession of himself, a desire of contact, rest, and a striving after conjunction, in order to behold what the adytum contains. But nothing will be present
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with him who beholds in any other way. The wise prophets, therefore, obscurely signified by these imitations how this [highest] God is seen. But the wise priest understanding the enigma, and having entered into the adytum, obtains a true vision of what is there. If, however, he has not entered, he will conceive this adytum to be a certain invisible thing, and will have a knowledge of the fountain and principle, as the principle of things. But when situated there, he will see the principle, and will be conjoined with it, by a union of like with like, neglecting nothing divine which the soul is able to possess. Prior to the vision also it requires that which remains from the vision. But that which remains to him who passes beyond all things, is that which is prior to all things. For the nature of the soul will never accede to that which is entirely non-being. But proceeding indeed downwards it will fall into evil; and thus into non-being, yet not into that which is perfect nonentity. Running, however, in a contrary direction, it will arrive not at another thing, but at itself. And thus not being in another thing, it is not on that account in nothing, but is in itself. *To be in itself alone, however, and not in being, is to be in God.* For God also is something which is not essence, but beyond essence. Hence the soul when in this condition associates with him. He, therefore, who perceives himself to associate with God, will have himself the similitude of him. And if he passes from himself as an image to the archetype, he will then have the end of his progression. But when he falls from the vision of God, if he again excites the virtue which is in himself, and perceives himself to be perfectly adorned; he will again be elevated through virtue, proceeding to intellect and wisdom, and afterwards to the principle of all things. *This, therefore, is the life of the Gods, and of divine and happy men, a liberation from all terrene concerns, a life unaccompanied with human pleasures, and a flight of the alone to the alone.*